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Reviewed by Paula Bolduc, assistant director of the academic development center, Salve 
Regina University, Newport, R.I. 
 
Frances Nesbitt Oppel’s Nietzsche on Gender: Beyond Man and Woman is a 
voyage into the discursive space between the dichotomies woman/man, women/men, 
female/male, and feminine/masculine. This haunting caesura to which Oppel refers is a 
place where her literary talents truly shine, especially in her efforts to help us re-imagine 
Nietzsche’s metaphors in a manner that is more consistent with contemporary feminist 
philosophy. As Oppel discredits worn-out metaphors, she recasts them in way that is new 
and invigorating. What is more, she not only analyzes each of Nietzsche’s texts but also 
listens to their tone.  
Oppel makes the argument that Nietzsche’s parodic style employs metaphors that 
produce an ironical reversal of meanings.  One sentence in Nietzsche’s aphorism 363 is 
enough to make this point: “For love, thought of in its entirety as great and full, is nature, 
and being nature it is in all eternity something ‘immoral’” (The Gay Science).  Oppel 
explains that the social-conforming speaker submits willingly to nature’s inevitable 
triumph over culture. For Nietzsche, such passive acceptance of social conventions 
regarding love is immoral. These conventions, according to Nietzsche and Oppel, 
clandestinely produce what we come to think of as “natural” gender differences between 
women and men, while at the same time they conceal insupportable prejudices that lead 
to injustice.  
Although the idea that it is “natural” for a woman to desire to be possessed by a 
man is immoral in Nietzsche’s view, just why this idea is immoral is left up to readers. 
Concerned that her readers might miss Nietzsche’s speaker’s punch line, Oppel 
paraphrases the aphorism as “We humans would like to be moral, but love is nature, and 
nature is immoral—and that, folks, is the way it is.” Say it, and it is so. Here Oppel hopes 
to spotlight an instance of classic Nietzschean reversal of meaning and takes Nietzsche’s 
ironic “endorsement” of the idea as his final position. Instead of the meaning of the words 
themselves, it is the aphorism’s overall tone that directs the readers to question the 
speaker’s integrity. Then, as if unsure of her thinking, she asks herself whether the 
speaker’s position on the subject is Nietzsche’s final word. She wonders if her own 
rejection of the speaker’s argument is the product of her own proclivities. Believing that 
the text actually conspires with her inclinations, Oppel concludes that aphorism 363 is a 
convincing example of Nietzsche’s deployment of overstatement to make a point. She 
claims that the aphorism is “full of internal contradictions and pointed repetitions” of 
particular words and phrases, such as “this natural opposition” and “antagonism.”  This 
sort of rhetoric is enough to cause her to question the straightforwardness of Nietzsche’s 
speaker, who also argues that woman’s “faithfulness” in love is sustained only by man’s 
perpetual state of desire.  According to this stubborn speaker, the possibility that a man 
might entirely devote himself to a woman is “illogical”—in such a case, a man would not 
be a man but rather a slave.   We are to understand from this speaker that woman can love 
only as a slave would and only in this way can she achieve womanly perfection. 
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Nietzsche wants readers to see the immorality of blindly following this conformist’s 
sexism. Oppel’s strategy works well here and makes a significant contribution to a fresh 
reading of Nietzsche’s texts and of this passage in particular. 
Surprisingly, what Oppel neglects to discuss is the title of the work in which the 
aphorism appears. In the “Translator’s Introduction” of The Gay Science, Walter 
Kaufmann mentions that Nietzsche specifically chose the term “gay” (Ger. fröhlich,
which means “joyous” or “merry,” and which did not connote homosexuality in the 
nineteenth century) to suggest “a light-hearted defiance of [social] convention,” morality 
and values. Why Oppel overlooks this obvious point in a book on gender we can only 
guess. Perhaps like Nietzsche, whose aphorisms are purposely written in such a way that 
they are left to our interpretation, Oppel intends for to us to speculate on her curious 
omission. This would be giving her the benefit of the doubt, since her style is never 
Nietzschean. The strategy of leaving conclusions up to readers, however, may better suit 
Nietzsche’s oeuvre than Oppel’s Nietzsche on Gender.
Although Oppel shows us how to interrogate our beliefs about gender, sex, and 
religion, she fails to address in any serious way the misuse of Nietzsche’s ideas by the 
Nazis during World War II. She ought to have done more than merely imply that we need 
to recognize that our values are culturally relative and historically contingent; she should 
have clarified that as pragmatic and moral as they may appear at the time, our values can 
turn out to be preposterous and unjust.  Even recent work by scholars such as Oliver 
Kelly, Anne G. Sabo, Luce Irigaray, Debra B. Bergoffen, Jacques Derrida, and Sarah 
Kofman, as well as Oppel herself, do not answer certain nagging questions related to the 
problem of moral contingency. Among these questions are: What can we learn from the 
historical misuses of Nietzsche’s ironic strategy? To what degree are we accountable for 
propagating some of the ideas that have been associated with heinous war crimes like 
those perpetrated by the SS during World War II? How do we prevent such egregious 
wrongdoings in the future? In addition to joining the ranks of feminists and academics in 
re-tooling clichéd metaphors, we might also ask how our research could benefit the most 
disadvantaged. One response Oppel could make is that by aiding her readers to reconsider 
Nietzschean irony, her book does address the misappropriation of his ideas.  On this 
count she is correct; my point is only that she needs to go beyond mere suggestion and 
make her point more explicit. 
Understandably, to expect Nietzsche on Gender to answer all these questions is 
unrealistic. Under Oppel’s guidance, we can at least work more confidently in conceiving 
a space “beyond ‘man’ and ‘woman’” by revisiting Nietzsche’s works.  She is an able 
guide who inspires us to question to what ends we blindly continue to exploit certain 
words, phrases, and metaphors. Oppel ends her useful, but somewhat frustrating book, on 
a hopeful note that going beyond gender difference is not as threatening as we might 
think, and that the greater threat is failing to imagine beyond gender difference. 
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